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Abstract
We deﬁne a framework for the analysis of access control policies that aims at easing the speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation tasks for security administrators. We consider policies in the category-based access control
model, which has been shown to subsume many of the most well known access control models (e.g., MAC,
DAC, RBAC). Using a graphical representation of category-based policies, we show how answers to usual
administrator queries can be automatically computed, and properties of access control policies can be
checked. We show applications in the context of emergency situations, where our framework can be used
to analyse the interaction between access control and emergency management.
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1 Introduction
Access control systems are used to protect resources against unauthorised use. In
its most basic form, an access control policy speciﬁes the actions that each user is
allowed to perform on each resource. A pair of a resource and an action is called a
permission.
A variety of access control models and languages for access control policy spec-
iﬁcation are currently in use. One of the most popular is the ANSI (hierarchical)
role-based access control (H-RBAC) model [2], where users are assigned to roles
and each role is assigned a set of permissions (extensions of RBAC, using time and
location constraints, are discussed in e.g., [19]). More ﬂexible models, such as the
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event-based access control (DEBAC) model [12] and the action-status access control
model [7], specify permissions that depend on dynamic conditions, deﬁned in terms
of events that happen in the system.
A metamodel for access control, which can be specialised for domain-speciﬁc
applications, has been proposed in [5]. It identiﬁes a core set of principles of access
control, abstracting away many of the complexities that are found in speciﬁc access
control models, in order to simplify the tasks of policy writing and policy analysis.
A key aspect of the metamodel is to focus attention on the notion of a category. A
category is a class of entities which share some property. Classic types of groupings
used in access control, like a role, a security clearance, a discrete measure of trust,
etc., are particular instances of the more general notion of category. In category-
based access control policies, permissions are assigned to categories of users (which
we refer to as principals), rather than to individual users. Categories can be deﬁned
on the basis of e.g., user attributes, geographical constraints, resource attributes.
For example, users may be assigned to diﬀerent categories according to their age, and
a policy can give a permission to perform an action (e.g., download) on a resource
(e.g., a ﬁlm) to users in the category “older than 12” but not in the category “child”.
In this way, permissions change in a dynamic and autonomous way (e.g., when a
registered user has a birthday), unlike, e.g., role-based access control models, which
require the intervention of a security administrator.
Given the complexities and scope involved in the deﬁnition of access control
policies, formal methods to analyse and reason about access control policies are
essential. This is particularly important in the case of systems dealing with access
control in the context of emergency situations, where users’ rights may need to
change in order to cope with speciﬁc emergencies. Formal speciﬁcations of access
control models and policies (see, for instance, [16,30]) have used theorem provers,
purpose-built logics, and, more recently, functional and rewriting-based approaches
(see, for example, [29,12]). A rewrite-based operational semantics for the category-
based metamodel was described in [14], where the expressive power of the meta-
model is also demonstrated. Using standard rewriting tools, rewrite-based security
policies can be veriﬁed to ensure that each access request has a unique answer, as
shown in [15].
In this paper, we deﬁne a framework for the analysis of access control policies
that aims at easing the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation tasks for security administra-
tors. We consider category-based policies, since the category-based model subsumes
the most well known access control models [14], thus allowing us to obtain a generic
framework. Using a graphical representation of policies, we show how answers to
usual administrator queries can be automatically computed, and properties of ac-
cess control policies (such as, every access request receives a unique answer) can be
checked. We show applications of the framework to the analysis of policies in dis-
tributed environments, and in particular policies that include management of rights
in emergency situations. For example, in a hospital environment, an access control
policy may specify that each doctor has access to the patient records of his/her own
patients. However, if a patient p has a cardiac arrest, then any doctor in the ward
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should have access to p’s medical records. We will show that this kind of policies
can be easily speciﬁed in our framework, in a visual and formal way, and properties,
such as the fact that the policy ensures a “separation of duty” constraint (where
no user should be allowed to perform two conﬂicting actions on the same resource),
can be easily proved using graph-based algorithms and rewriting techniques.
Overview of the paper.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall
the category-based access control model. Section 3 discusses emergency policies.
Section 4 presents a graph-based framework to represent and analyse category-
based policies, and Section 5 describes its implementation (a Ruby application for
policy visualisation and analysis). In Section 6, we discuss related work, and in
Section 7, conclusions are drawn and further work is suggested.
2 Preliminaries: The Category-Based Metamodel
We assume familiarity with basic notions on ﬁrst-order logic and term-rewriting
systems [3]. We brieﬂy describe below the key concepts underlying the category-
based metamodel of access control; see [5] for a detailed description.
Informally, a category is any of several distinct classes or groups to which entities
may be assigned. Entities are denoted by constants in a many sorted domain of
discourse, including: a countable set C of categories, denoted c0, c1, . . . ; a countable
set P of principals, denoted p0, p1, . . . (we assume that principals that request access
to resources are pre-authenticated); a countable set A of named actions, denoted
a0, a1, . . . ; a countable set R of resource identiﬁers, denoted r0, r1, . . . ; a ﬁnite set
Auth of possible answers to access requests (e.g., {grant, deny, undetermined}) and
a countable set S of situational identiﬁers to denote environmental information.
More generally, entities are represented by terms (e.g., a principal is represented
by a data structure principal(pi, attributeList)), but constants will be suﬃcient for
most examples in this paper.
The metamodel includes the following relations:
• Principal-category assignment: PCA ⊆ P × C, such that (p, c) ∈ PCA iﬀ a
principal p ∈ P is assigned to the category c ∈ C.
• Permission-category assignment: ARCA ⊆ A×R×C, such that (a, r, c) ∈ ARCA
iﬀ the action a ∈ A on resource r ∈ R can be performed by principals assigned
to the category c ∈ C.
• Authorisations: PAR ⊆ P × A × R, such that (p, a, r) ∈ PAR iﬀ a principal
p ∈ P can perform the action a ∈ A on the resource r ∈ R.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Axioms] The relation PAR satisﬁes the following core axiom,
where we assume that there exists a relationship ⊆ between categories; this can
simply be equality, set inclusion (the set of principals assigned to c ∈ C is a subset
of the set of principals assigned to c′ ∈ C), or a speciﬁc relation may be used.
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(a1) ∀p ∈ P, ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ R,
∃c, c′ ∈ C, ((p, c) ∈ PCA ∧ c ⊆ c′ ∧ (a, r, c′) ∈ ARCA) ⇔ (p, a, r) ∈ PAR
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Category-based policy] A category based policy is a tuple
〈E ,PCA,ARCA,PAR〉, where E = (P, C,A,R,S), such that axiom (a1) is satisﬁed.
Operationally, axiom (a1) can be realised through a set of functions, as shown
in [14]. We recall the deﬁnition of the function par(P,A,R) below; it relies on
functions pca, which returns the list of categories assigned to a principal, and arca,
which returns a list of permissions assigned to a category.
Deﬁnition 2.3 A rewrite-based speciﬁcation of the axiom (a1) in Def. 2.1 is given
by the rewrite rule:
(a2) par(P,A,R) → if (A,R) ∈ arca∗(contain(pca(P ))) then grant else deny
As the function name suggests, contain computes the set of categories that contain
any of the categories given in the list pca(P ). The function ∈ is a membership
operator on lists, grant and deny are answers, and arca∗ generalises the function
arca to take into account lists of categories:
arca∗(nil) → nil arca∗(cons(C,L)) → append(arca(C), arca∗(L))
An access request by a principal p to perform the action a on the resource r can
then be evaluated simply by rewriting the term par(p, a, r) to normal form.
The axiom (a1), and its algebraic version (a2), state that a request by a principal
p to perform the action a on a resource r is authorised only if p belongs to a category
c such that for some category below c (e.g., c itself) the action a is authorised on
r, otherwise the request is denied. There are other alternatives, e.g., considering
undeterminate as answer if there is not enough information to grant the request.
An axiomatisation of distributed category-based access control was proposed
in [11] to specify federative policies, obtained as a composition of individual ac-
cess control policies. In a federation, each member has its own access control policy,
and contributes to the deﬁnition of a global access control policy. We will use this
notion of distributed access control to deﬁne emergency policies in the next section.
We recall the main axioms below.
Assume the set S of situational identiﬁers includes identiﬁers for sites, i.e., s ∈ S
identiﬁes one of the components of the federation. PCAs, ARCAs, and PARs
denote families of relations indexed by site identiﬁers. Intuitively, PARs denotes
the authorisations that are valid in the site s. The relation PAR deﬁning the
global authorisation policy is obtained by composing the local policies deﬁned by
the relations PARs as indicated below. The sets P, C,A,R include, respectively,
the principals, categories, actions and resources in any of the sites of the system,
which are assumed to be globally known in the federation (alternatively we can
deﬁne sets Ps, Cs, As, Rs for each site).
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Deﬁnition 2.4 [Distributed Axioms] The distributed category-based metamodel is
deﬁned by the following core axioms
(b1) ∀p ∈ P, ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S,
(∃c, c′ ∈ C, (p, c) ∈ PCAs ∧ c ⊆ c′ ∧ (a, r, c′) ∈ ARCAs) ⇔ (p, a, r) ∈ PARs
(f1) ∀p ∈ P, ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ R,
(p, a, r) ∈ OPpar({PARs | s ∈ S}) ⇔ (p, a, r) ∈ PAR
The result of an access request may be diﬀerent depending on the site where the
request is evaluated. The axiom (f1) describes the global authorisation relation,
which is obtained from the ones deﬁned at each site by using the operator OPpar.
While most of the existing policy languages (e.g., XACML) have a ﬁxed set of
operators to combine policies, the metamodel can accommodate a large range of
composition operators.
Deﬁnition 2.5 A distributed category-based policy is deﬁned by the tuple
〈E , {PCAi}i∈S , {ARCAi}i∈S , {PARi}i∈S ,OPpar〉, such that axioms (b1) and (f1)
are satisﬁed.
The operational semantics of the distributed model is deﬁned by extending
the functions presented in Deﬁnition 2.3, using distributed term rewrite systems
(DTRSs), which are term rewrite systems where rules are partitioned into modules,
each associated with a unique identiﬁer, and function symbols are annotated with
such identiﬁers (for more details on DTRSs, we refer to [12]). In other words, spe-
ciﬁc functions deﬁned in a particular site are indexed by the site identiﬁer; functions
with no site annotations are assumed to be deﬁned locally.
Deﬁnition 2.6 In a distributed environment, the rewrite-based speciﬁcation of the
axiom (b1) in Def. 2.4 is given by the rewrite rule:
(b2) pars(P,A,R) → if (A,R) ∈ arca∗s(contain(pcas(P ))) then grant else deny
where the function ∈ is a membership operator on lists, grant and deny are answers,
and arca∗s is the function deﬁning the assignment of privileges to categories, as in
the previous section.
The axiom (f1) can be realised by the following rewrite rule, which implements
OPpar through the use of pars, where the function fauth combines the results into
a ﬁnal answer according to the operator op:
(f2) authorised(p, a, r, s1, . . . , sn) → fauth(op, pars1(p, a, r), . . . , parsn(p, a, r)).
The axiom (f1) can be implemented in several ways. The version chosen in
the deﬁnition above corresponds to a very general rewrite rule that can be used for
evaluating an access request in a single central site (if n = 1 and the operator op
is the identity), as well as for evaluating combinations of answers (with a suitable
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operator op) from n diﬀerent local policies. Functions such as psite(p), which returns
the site where the principal p is registered, or rsite(r) which returns the site where
the resource r is located, may be used. In this way, access requests can be evaluated
in a predeﬁned central site, or priority can be given to local evaluation, or more
elaborated combinations of access answers can be implemented. We refer to [13,10]
for examples.
3 Emergency policies
In this paper we consider a particular kind of policy composition, where an access
control policy is combined with an emergency policy that speciﬁes how various
emergency situations aﬀect the rights of users to access resources. In this approach,
events are elementary or compound actions [22], which we represent using terms of
the form event(ei, p, a, o, t, l), following [14]. Here, event is a data constructor, ei is
an event identiﬁer, p is a principal associated to the event, a is an action, o its object,
t is the time when the event happened, and l is a list of arguments (depending on
the event type, some arguments might not be required). Emergency policies will
be associated to speciﬁc events. To simplify, we consider only atomic events, and
assume that a history of all events that happened in the system is available (e.g.,
via a log). We follow the deﬁnition of emergency given in [18]:
An emergency takes place at time T if an event E happened at a time Ts which is
earlier than T , and resulted in the initiation of the emergency, and this emergency
has not been ended before T as a consequence either of (i) clipping, i.e., an event
E′ happening at a time T ′ between Ts and T that causes the emergency to be
terminated or (ii) expiring a timeout δ for this emergency.
For example, in a hospital environment, an access control policy may specify that
each doctor has access to the patient records of his/her own patients. However, if
a patient p has a cardiac arrest, then any doctor in the ward should have access to
p’s medical records during the cardiac emergency.
The distributed metamodel and the notion of event deﬁned above can be used
to specify access control in emergency situations. We consider two sites π1 and π2
such that π1 contains a standard policy and π2 contains an emergency policy. In
the previous example, let patient be a category consisting of all patients (of a given
hospital), and doctor be a category consisting of all doctors (of the given hospital).
Let doctor(X) be a (parameterised) category consisting of all doctors of the patient
X, such that for all X, doctor(X) ⊆ doctor, i.e., the category doctor(X) inherits
all permissions from the category doctor. Assume the relations PCA and ARCA
satisfy the following axioms, where emerg(bcrd, P ) is true if an event initiating a
cardiac emergency for P has been detected, and no event ending the emergency has
been recorded:
∀P, (P, patient) ∈ PCA ⇒ (read, record(P ), doctor(P )) ∈ ARCAπ1
∀P, (P, patient) ∈ PCA ∧ emerg(bcrd, P ) ⇒ (read, record(P ), doctor) ∈ ARCAπ2
S. Alves, M. Fernández / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 312 (2015) 89–10594
Operationally, we specify rewrite rules for arca in the standard (π1) and emergency
(π2) sites, and combine the policies using a union operator with priority to grant.
arcaπ1(doctor(P )) → [(read, record(P ))]
arcaπ2(doctor) → [(read, record(P )) | P ∈ patientList ∧ emerg(bcrd, P )])
where patientList returns the list of patients, that is, P such that patient ∈ pca(P ).
We discuss in the following section techniques to prove properties of such policies,
e.g., to show that any doctor has access to the record of a patient suﬀering a cardiac
emergency.
4 Analysis of Category-Based Policies
4.1 Graph Representation of Policies
We start by deﬁning how policies can be represented by means of graphs. Graph-
ical or visual representations of data structures and algorithms have a number of
established and signiﬁcant advantages over textual representations. In particular,
they tend to be easier to understand and analyse than the corresponding textual
representations. Furthermore, being a well-studied area, algorithms and properties
of graph theory can be used to analyse properties of policies.
Deﬁnition 4.1 [Policy graph] We deﬁne a policy graph, or graph for short, as a
tuple G = (V, E, lv, le), where V is a set of nodes, E is a set of undirected edges,
which is a subset of {{v1, v2} | v1, v2 ∈ V ∧ v1 = v2}, lv is an injective labelling
function mapping nodes to entities in the category-based metamodel lv : V →
P ∪ C ∪ A ∪R, and le is a labelling function for edges.
We assume the usual notion of degree of a node, as the number of edges connected
to that node.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A path in G of length n, between two nodes v0, vn, is a sequence
v0, v1, . . . , vn, such that {vi−1, vi} ∈ E for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Since we have diﬀerent types of nodes, we deﬁne a function type : V →
{P,C,A,R}, which associates each node with the type of its label. More precisely,
type(v) = P if lv(v) = p ∈ P (that is, P is the type of the nodes representing
principals), and, similarly, C is the type of nodes representing categories, A actions,
and R resources. Furthermore, we consider the type of an edge to be determined
by the type of the nodes connected by that edge, that is, we consider a function
type : E → {P,C,A,R} × {P,C,A,R}. An edge-type will be a pair (T1, T2), which
for simplicity we will represent as T1T2. For example, AC is the type of an edge
connecting a node of type A with a node of type C. Note that, since our edges are
undirected, we do not distinguish between the types T1T2 and T2T1.
We will use types to restrict the edges of graphs representing policies, as follows.
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Deﬁnition 4.3 [Well-typed policy graph] A policy graph is well typed if it contains
only the following kinds of edges
(a) {v1, v2} ∈ E such that type(v1) = P ∧ type(v2) = C, which connect principals
to categories. This corresponds to an edge of type PC.
(b) {v1, v2} ∈ E such that type(v1) = C ∧ type(v2) = A, which connect categories
to actions. This corresponds to an edge of type CA.
(c) {v1, v2} ∈ E such that type(v1) = A ∧ type(v2) = R, which connect actions to
resources. This corresponds to an edge of type AR.
Deﬁnition 4.4 [Relations associated with G] Let G be a well-typed policy graph
and let PC, CA andAR be the set of all edges of types PC, CA andAR, respectively.
Then we deﬁne the following relations associated with G:
• The relation PCAG is deﬁned by the set {(lv(v1), lv(v2)) | type(v1) = P∧{v1, v2} ∈
PC}. It can also be deﬁned by the set of paths of size 1, starting from nodes of
type P .
• The relation ARCAG is given by the set {(lv(v1), lv(v2), lv(v3)) | type(v1) =
A ∧ {v1, v2} ∈ AR ∧ {v3, v2} ∈ CR}. It can also be deﬁned by the set of paths
of size 2, starting from nodes of type C and ending on nodes of type R (or
vice-versa).
• The relation PARG is given by the set {(lv(v1), lv(v3), lv(v4)) | ∃v2 s.t. {v1, v2} ∈
PC ∧ {v2, v3} ∈ CA ∧ {v3, v4} ∈ AR}. It can also be deﬁned by the set of paths
of size 3, starting from nodes of type P and ending on nodes of type R (or
vice-versa).
Proposition 4.5 Any path of size 3 in a policy graph, starting in a node of type P
and ending in a node of type R, must have the following shape:
P C A R
Proof. Direct consequence of the restriction imposed on edge types. Note that all
the paths of length 1 starting in a node of type P end on a node of type C. The
paths of length 1 starting from a node of type C end on a node of type A or a node
of type P and the paths of length 1 starting from a node of type A end on a node
of type C or a node of type R. Hence, the only paths of size 3 starting in a node of
type P and ending in a node of type R are the ones that traverse a node of type C
and a node of type A. 
Therefore, from all the paths of size 3 starting in a node of type P and ending
in a node of type R, one can eﬀectively compute the PAR relation (for the moment
we are not taking into account the ⊆ relation between categories). Furthermore, it
is easy to see that any well-typed policy graph represents an access control policy.
Proposition 4.6 Each well-typed policy graph G deﬁnes a unique category-based
access control policy 〈E ,PCAG ,ARCAG ,PARG〉.
Proof. According to Def. 2.2, we need to prove that PCAG , ARCAG and PARG
S. Alves, M. Fernández / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 312 (2015) 89–10596
satisfy axiom (a1), which follows by Def. 4.4 (for now we are considering that the
relation ⊆ between categories is the equality relation, but we will deal with the
general case later). 
However, for a given policy, there may be more than one graph that generates
the policy; for example, take any graph that diﬀers on the unassigned permissions
(that is, diﬀering on edges between actions and resources such that there is no edge
connecting the action to any category). There is, however, a unique minimal graph
corresponding to the policy.
Deﬁnition 4.7 [Types for paths] Let v0, v1, . . . , vn be a path of length n, such that
type(vi) = Ti for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The type of the path is the sequence given by the types
of the edges along the path, that is T0T1, T1T2, . . . , Tn−1Tn.
The relations PCAG , ARCAG and PARG can now be deﬁned in terms of typed-
paths of a certain type. For example:
PARG = {(lv(v1), lv(v3), lv(v4)) | v1, v2, v3, v4 is a path of type PC,CA,AR}.
Note also that one can deﬁne the minimum unique graph as the set of paths of type
CA and the set of paths of type CA,AR.
This formalisation of the category-based metamodel as graphs does not take into
account distributed policies. This can be obtained by considering that for each site
there is a special additional node in the graph, with type S, labelled with the site
identiﬁer, and to which all the principals of that site are connected.
Deﬁnition 4.8 [Distributed policy graph] Let G = (V, E, lv, le) be a well-typed
policy graph representing a policy and let s ∈ S be a location identiﬁer in the
distributed system. Then Gs, the policy graph of site s, is deﬁned by (V ∪{vs}, E ∪
{{vs, v} | v ∈ V ∧ type(v) = P}, lv′, le′), where lv′ and le′ extend lv and le in the
natural way, that is, by mapping vs to s.
A distributed policy graph is a tuple of graphs (Gs1 , . . . ,Gsn) where Gsi =
(Vi, Ei, lv′i, le′i) is the policy graph for si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each location s ∈ S,
the relations PCAs, ARCAs and PARs are deﬁned (as paths on Gs) as in the
non-distributed scenario.
Using graphs to formalise the global authorisation policy PAR is not so straight-
forward. One possibility to deﬁne PAR is simply by the union, but there are much
more sophisticated ways to combine the policies. For now we will take the union of
the diﬀerent policies.
Deﬁnition 4.9 [Union graph] Let (Gs1 , . . . ,Gsn) be a distributed policy graph with
n sites s1, . . . , sn, where each Gsi = (Vi, Ei, lvi, lei). Their associated union-graph
is deﬁned by G = (V, E, lv, le), where V is a set of nodes such that for each vi ∈ Vi
where lvi(vi) = x there exists a unique node ν ∈ V such that lv(ν) = x, E is a
multiset of edges such that if {v1, v2} ∈ Ei, then there is an edge {ν1, ν2} ∈ E
where lvi(v1) = lv(ν1) and lvi(v2) = lv(ν2) and lei({v1, v2}) = le({ν1, ν2}).
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Since multiple edges can connect the same pair of nodes, this corresponds to a
multigraph. Note that the entities of the metamodel (principals, categories, actions
and resources) can be known by diﬀerent sites. This means that in the graph
representation of the global policy one has to be able to distinguish whether a
node/edge belongs to a particular site or not. To that end, we deﬁne two functions
visibleV : V → 2S and visibleE : E → S, such that, for each node v, visibleV(v) will
return the set of sites that have a node with the same label as v, that is, the set of
sites where v is known, and similarly for each edge e visibleE(e) will return e’s site.
Deﬁnition 4.10 A path of length n in the union-graph G, between two nodes v0, vn,
is a sequence v0, v1, . . . , vn, such that {vi−1, vi} ∈ E for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and all the
edges e1, . . . , en in the path are visible in the same site.
Proposition 4.11 A union graph G, deﬁnes a distributed category-based policy
where OPpar is a union operator with priority to grant.
Proof. According to Def. 2.5, we need to prove that axioms (b1) and (f1) are
satisﬁed. Axiom (b1) follows from each Gsi , and for axiom (f1) if there exists a
path of type PC,CA,AR ( visibleE is always the same for all the edges in the path),
then this path also exists in some Gsj , which means that par(p, a, r) ∈ PARsj ,
therefore it will belong to OPpar{PARs | s ∈ S} if OPpar is a union operator with
priority to grant. 
One could consider copies of the same entity as diﬀerent nodes, which could be
linked, and then collapsed into a single node when visually displaying the graph.
We will discuss later, diﬀerent options for eﬀectively displaying a policy. The
visibleV , visibleE functions deﬁned above will be useful in the deﬁnition of visual-
isation algorithms. In terms of graph representation, other more sophisticated com-
binations of policies could be deﬁned taking into account, for example, conﬂicting
information, but we will deal with that in the future.
Up to this point we have not taken into account in our graph formalisation of
the metamodel the ⊆ relation between categories. As mentioned before, this could
be achieved by deﬁning a function contain on nodes of type C. However, this would
no longer allow us to deﬁne certain properties based solely on paths.
Alternatively we formalise the ⊆ relation in terms of edges of type CC. That is,
we allow the set of edges to contain edges of the form {c1, c2}, such that type(c1) =
type(c2) = C. Note that edges are undirected, however, in ⊆ one might have
c1 ⊆ c2 but not c2 ⊆ c1. Therefore, when deﬁning paths involving edges of type
CC one needs to know in which direction these edges can be transversed. We
deﬁne a function target on edges such that, if vi ∈ target({v1, v2}) then vi can be a
destination node of that edge (note that both v1, v2 can be destination nodes of an
edge, if it can be transversed in both directions). We need a more constrained notion
of path taking into account the target function, so we will reﬁne Deﬁnition 4.10:
Deﬁnition 4.12 A constrained path of length n in G = (V, E, lv, le), is a sequence
v0, v1, . . . , vn, such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, {vi−1, vi} ∈ E ∧ vi ∈ target({vi−1, vi}).
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Deﬁnition 4.13 Let c1, c2 be two categories in C, then c1 ⊆ c2 if there is a con-
strained path of type (CC)∗ 4 between the nodes labelled by c1 and c2.
In this paper we are only considering a relation ⊆ between categories, but the
same could be considered for other entities (for example resources or actions).
Deﬁnition 4.14 [Dynamic policy graph] A dynamic policy graph is a well-typed
graph G = (V, E, lv, le) together with a function ld on V such that ld(v) = R, for
some convergent rewrite system R satisfying the following conditions:
• if type(v) = P , then ld(v) deﬁnes a function pca, which returns (for each p) a list
of categories;
• if type(v) = C, then ld(v) deﬁnes a function arca, which (for each c) returns a list
of permissions (pairs of the form (action,resource)).
Relations between the entities in our model can change in an autonomous way
(e.g. due to events that happen in the system), with principals/permissions being
added or removed from certain categories. In this sense a policy graph can be seen
as a photo-shot of the system at a particular time. From the graph one can extract
the relations PCA, ARCA and PAR at a particular instant, but not how to get
the next photo. This is the purpose of the ld function.
Deﬁnition 4.15 A dynamic policy graph is said to be correct (at a particular
instant) iﬀ:
• for every node v of type P , ld(v) = [c1, . . . , cn] iﬀ there exists an edge {v, vi} in
E for i = 1, . . . , n, such that lv(vi) = ci;
• for every node v of type C, ld(v) = [(a1, r1), . . . , (an, rn)] iﬀ there exists in E
edges {vai, vri} and {v, vai} for i = 1, . . . , n such that lv(vai) = ai, lv(vri) = ri
and lv(v) = c;
A dynamic policy graph represents a dynamic category-based policy. Each re-
quest has a unique answer if the associated dynamic graph is correct.
4.2 Analysis of static properties based on graphs
For a given policy, we are interested in checking certain properties in terms of prin-
cipals, categories, resources, and permissions. We ﬁrst consider a non-distributed
system. As examples of static properties one can be interested in checking, we con-
sider the following: (i) Are all the principals associated with at least one category?
(ii) Are there permissions associated to all categories? (iii) Are all the resources in
eﬀective use (in terms of principals and permissions)? (iv) For a given category, who
are the associated principals? (v) To which categories belongs a given principal?
(vi) For a given category, what are the associated permissions? (vii) For a given
principal, what are the associated permissions?
4 We consider the usual notation of a∗ to refer to a sequence of the form a, a, . . . , a
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, with n ≥ 0.
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For a given policy represented by a well-typed graph G = (V, E, lv, le), the
properties above can be formalised in the following way:
(i) All the principals are associated with at least one category if the degree of every
node of type P is positive (in a distributed scenario where all the principals are
connected to the site(s) node(s), then this property is guaranteed by ensuring
that all the principals are connected to a node of type C);
(ii) For each node of type C there is a path of type (CC)∗, CA,AR.
(iii) For each node of type R there is a path of type PC, (CC)∗, CA,AR.
(iv) For a given node of type C, ﬁnd all the neighbours of type P .
(v) For a given node of type P , ﬁnd all the neighbours of type C.
(vi) For a given node of type C, ﬁnd all the paths of type (CC)∗, CA,AR. The last
two nodes of each path will deﬁne a permission associated to that category.
(vii) For a given node of type P , ﬁnd all the paths of type PC, (CC)∗, CA,AR. The
last two nodes will deﬁne the permissions associated to that principal.
Proposition 4.16 All the checks above can be computed in polynomial time with
respect to |V |+ |E|.
Note that the properties mentioned above are still valid in a distributed scenario,
either by considering paths in the individual graphs Gs1 , . . . ,Gsn , or the notion of
paths in the union-graph deﬁned above.
Other static properties can be checked using properties on the underlying graph
of the policy, speciﬁcally for the distributed scenario. For example, detecting
whether there are permissions that are in conﬂict. If an action a1 in a resource
r is in conﬂict with an action a2 in r, then for every principal p there should only
be one path of type PC, (CC)∗, CA,AR linking p and r in the union graph.
One can also ask, for a given union graph, what is the minimum unique graph
that corresponds to a policy. This can be computed by starting in nodes of type S
and considering the edges that are in the spanning tree considering only branches
that end in nodes of type P , C and R. This way one eliminates edges between
nodes of type A and R that are not associated to any category, and edges between
nodes of type C and R that are not associated to any resource.
There are more complex and relevant questions that can be dealt with using this
formalism. For example:
• For a given policy-graph G, and given sets of principals {p1, . . . , pn} and permis-
sions {(a1, r1), . . . , (an, rn)}, what is a minimum number of changes (in term of
adding/deleting elements in the PCA and ARCA relations) necessary to ensure
that, collectively, the given set of principals has the given permissions?
Although this is a generally complex problem, by ﬁxing either the number of
principals or permissions we can obtain manageable instances of the problem.
• For a given policy-graph G, and given sets of principals {p1, . . . , pn} and permis-
sions {(a1, r1), . . . , (an, rn)}, what is the minimal number of edges necessary to
guarantee that those, and those alone, permissions are available to those users?
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One might be interested in guaranteeing a particular set of permission assign-
ment, but in a controlled manner, particularly in a emergency scenario. For a
single pair (p, (a, r)), this corresponds to ﬁnding the shortest path in the graph,
connecting the principal to the permission.
4.3 Application: Emergency Management
Our main motivation is to provide an analysis framework to deal with policy up-
dates, allowing security administrators to detect changes introduced into a policy in
a scenario involving emergency situations. As mentioned in Section 3, an emergency
policy can be modelled using an additional emergency site. The graph representa-
tion of a policy in an emergency scenario will be given by combining the graphs of
the normal policy with the emergency policy (taking an appropriate composition
operator). For example, when combining the two policies using a union operator
with priority to grant, then the union-graph deﬁned above will suﬃce.
The analysis described in the last section can then be used to specify properties
when dealing with the emergency. For example, one guarantees that in the case of
a patient i suﬀering a cardiac emergency any doctor has access to his/her medical
record, by showing that, for every principal p in the category doctor, there exists
a path of type PC, (CC)∗, CA,AR of the form p, c+, access, recordi in the graph
associated to the emergency policy.
The graphs of the normal and emergency policies can be used to analyse other
properties. For example, one might wish to determine what are the permissions
revoked by the emergency; the permissions created by the emergency; whether or
not every principal has a certain permission during the emergency; whether or
not a certain action is forbidden during the emergency, etc. All these properties
can easily be established using our graph formalisation. “Separation of duties”
constraints also correspond to path constraints. For example, the constraint “no
user has permission to both activate an alarm (triggering an emergency and possibly
acquiring more permissions) and delete the emergency log (which records which users
have activated alarms)” holds if the set of paths of type PC, (CC)∗, CA,AR in the
policy graph does not include a path ending in activate, alarm and a path ending
in delete, log, and starting in the same node of type P .
5 A tool to analyse policies
In this section we describe a tool to analyse policies using the graph formalisation.
5.1 Visual representation of policies
As we mentioned before, using graphs to formally represent policies in the category
based metamodel has numerous advantages in terms of algorithms and well estab-
lished properties from graph-theory that can be used to analyse properties of these
policies, as well as tools for displaying graphs in an eﬀective way.
Recall that we deﬁned a distributed system as a tuple (G1, . . . ,Gn), and the
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union-graph G as the multigraph combining all the information from the individual
policies Gi. Also recall that, each Gi contains a special node of type S, to which every
principal is connected. Since entities in P ∪ C ∪A∪R can be global to all the sites
an appropriate visual display of the system should clearly show in which sites each
entity is. Ideally one would like to represent the system in a 3-dimensional space,
where each site would be at a diﬀerent horizontal plane, where the identities common
to several sites would be vertically aligned. Diﬀerent horizontal planes could be
selected and merged to combine the policies. Given the degree of complexity in
manipulating/displaying this type of graphics, we consider alternative options:
• All the diﬀerent Gi are represented in the same plane, but diﬀerent colours are
used to identify the diﬀerent sites (if a node is known in several sites then it is
surrounded by a diﬀerent colour ring for each site it belongs to).
• By selecting a node site (a node of type S), then all the colours of the other sites
turn to grey, therefore highlighting the selected site.
• Since we are representing a multigraph, there can be several edges between the
same nodes. They should be represented using the colour associated to their site.
• To further highlight a selection, the size of the involved nodes can be augmented
(or the nodes not involved can be diminished).
Note that, unconnected entities cannot be associated to any site, in which case
the function visibleV can be used to determine the colour(s) of the nodes. When
representing the union-graph, the function visibleE is also used to determine the
colour of the edges. Other possibilities could be considered such as representing
diﬀerent copies of the same entity corresponding to the diﬀerent sites where it
occurs, and using especial edges to connect the diﬀerent copies. Each policy could
then be displayed separately, with the connection to other policies being given by the
additional edges. This alternative would give a clear visualisation of each individual
policy (particularly if the additional edges could be omitted), but would not provide
a proper overview of the general policy.
5.2 A Ruby prototype
An application called Policy Manager [28] was implemented to provide an easy
to use graphical tool for security administrators, allowing the construction and
management of multiple policies. The application was implemented in Ruby [21]:
an interpreted, object-oriented, multi-paradigm programming language.
In terms of graphical display of policy data, the Policy Manager provides user-
friendly visual representations that facilitate the task of identifying policy ﬂaws. The
application provides the user with a complete view of a policy as a tree, allowing
users to zoom in on overcrowded sections of the tree. It also allows the selection
of particular entities, highlighting the nodes and edges associated to that entity.
For example, by clicking on a principal name, the tree will centre on the selected
object, allowing a clearer view of the categories and permissions associated to that
principal. Furthermore, the user is able to reposition the elements by dragging, as
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well as remove irrelevant elements from the view. The application also comprises a
textual view, allowing for simple queries concerning the policy.
One key aspect of the project was the implementation of the dynamic behaviour
of categories. Unlike roles in RBAC, categories can change dynamically based on
events or changes in the state of the system (emergencies can be seen as speciﬁc kinds
of events). To represent dynamic graphs (see Def. 4.14), the tool allows the user to
save Ruby code describing events in the database. This, however, requires the users
to have knowledge of the Ruby language, as well as raising security issues. A more
desirable solution, would be to deﬁne a user-friendly Domain Speciﬁc Language, to
allow users to specify categories and permissions, for example, using rewrite rules.
This language could then be compiled into code to be inserted in the policy database
(as is currently done with the Ruby code used to specify categories).
6 Related Work
Several formal languages have been used in the literature to model and analyse
access control problems. Koch et al. [26] use graphs to formalise RBAC, in particular
by modelling role management operations by graph transformation rules. More
recently, [6,29,12] use term rewrite rules to model particular access control models
and to express access control policies. Our approach combines the use of a graph
formalism to represent a concrete state of the system, and the use of rewrite rules
to model the dynamics of the system. The Generalised TRBAC model [25] and
ASL [23] aim at providing a general framework for the deﬁnition of policies, however
they focus essentially on the notion of users, groups and roles (interpreted as being
synonymous with the notion of job function). Li et al.’s RT family of role-trust
models [27] provides a general framework specialised for deﬁning speciﬁc policy
requirements (in terms of credentials).
The speciﬁcation of policies by means of rewriting systems allows, not only to
take advantage of the extensive theory of rewriting to establish security properties,
as shown in [29,17,10] amongst other works, but also to make use of rewriting-based
frameworks (such as CiME, MAUDE or TOM) to reason about policy properties.
Our work addresses similar issues, but is based on a notion of category-based access
control for distributed environments, which we interpret using labelled graphs, and
which can be instantiated to include concepts like times, events, and histories that
are not included as elements of RT or RBAC. In [15], CiME is integrated in a tool
designed to automatically check consistency and totality of RBAC access control
policies. A similar technique could be used to analyse the rewrite system in a
dynamic policy graph.
The framework that we have described is more expressive than any of the
Datalog-based languages that have been proposed for distributed access control
(see [4,24,20,8]); these languages, being based on a monotonic semantics, are not
especially well suited for representing dynamically changing distributed policies.
Another work dealing with decentralised systems is reported in [9], where the au-
thors propose the constraint logic programming language SecPal for specifying a
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wide range of authorisation policies and credentials, using predicates deﬁned by
clauses. In our approach, we focus on graph interpretations of a general metamodel
suitable for distributed systems rather than on the design of a speciﬁcation lan-
guage, but the operational semantics of the metamodel could serve as a basis for a
policy deﬁnition language.
7 Conclusions and Further Work
This paper describes a framework that aims at aiding the speciﬁcation and analysis
of access control policies, by using a graph-based formalism to represent policies
and relying on graph properties to extract policy properties. In Section 4 we focus
on properties that are mostly static, but we are also interested in other (dynamic)
properties (such as verifying that at any point in time, each access request to a
resource by a principal will always receive a unique answer), which are related to
the operational semantics (deﬁned using term rewriting). In future work, to analyse
dynamic properties of policies and help administrators develop and manage policy
updates, we plan to develop a version of Policy Manager within PORGY [1], a tool
that allows users to visualise and simulate systems via port-graph rewriting.
Additionally, in the context of an analysis application such as Policy Manager,
one would be interested in being able to describe dynamic behaviour using a user-
friendly Domain Speciﬁc Language, suitable for policy administrators. We believe
that a rewriting-based language could be an appropriate solution to that problem.
This would provide an implementation of the operational semantics of the category-
based metamodel in Policy Manager, could be integrated with tools such as CiME
to verify desirable properties, and translated into other programming languages for
integration in policy analysis tools.
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